Holderness, Arthur

Arthur Holderness is believed to be the soldier referred to on the Strathroy cenotaph, even though it seems he spent very little time here. He was born December 14, 1890, in England. A border crossing form dated April 15th, 1914, from Michigan to Port Huron,  gives his permanent address as Strathroy.  His occupation is given as “Potter” on one document and “porter” on another. Four months after arriving in Ontario, August 31, 1914, he had a medical exam at Valcartier, Quebec, and on September 22, 1914, he joined the Infantry there.

He served in the 1st Canadian Infantry Battalion, Western Ontario Regiment in France. He “went missing in action” on or after  15 June 1915 at Givenchy France. He was 24 years old. He was eligible for the 14-15 Star. His medal, plaque and scroll, and Memorial Cross all went to his mother in Nottingham, England.  His mother and father had separate addresses in Nottingham, England. Since his body was never recovered or identified, he is honoured on the Vimy Memorial.

 [Source: Strathroy – Caradoc Museum]

Index No M.R. 23, Vimy Memorial, Part III F-H

Here is some background information about what was happening on the “Western Front” in Europe around the time Private Holderness and fellow Strathroy veteran Captain Frederic Wilfred Robinson were killed.

Actions in the spring and summer of 1915 (Western Front)

15 June – August 1915: “localized operations seeking tactical advantage”

After the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, the French high command came to believe that the British could undertake an offensive action, not just fight a dogged defence. The prestige of the British in that operation, which was judged by all to have been a success even though it fell far short of the strategic goal of breaking through to Lille, rose considerably. It led to increased French pressure for the British army, still small and woefully under-gunned, to play an increasing part in offensive warfare. The Battles of Aubers and Festubert in May 1915 came as a result of this pressure, with woeful results.

General situation in the middle of 1915

From the end off the Battles of Ypres and Festubert in May 1915 until the September opening of the Battle of Loos and the French attacks in Champagne, there was no general change in the situation on the Western Front. It was a period of static warfare, where the army suffered average losses of 300 men a day from sniping and shellfire, while they continued to gradually improve and consolidate the trenches. Both sides increased the tempo of underground mine warfare, which was feared greatly by the infantry in the front positions. At the request of French Commander-in-Chief Joffre, on 7-8 June 1915, the British Second Army extended its left to Boesinghe, thus placing it for the first time in complete occupation of the Ypres salient. Late in May, the First Army also extended, going southwards 5 miles from Cuinchy towards Lens. During August a Third Army was formed, taking over a 15-mile front from Curlu to Hébuterne, on the Somme. Further discussions about Allied dispositions and strategy took place at the 1st Inter-Allied Military Conference on 7 July 1915.

The army continued to suffer from a shortage of material, notably heavy artillery and machine guns (although Lewis guns were officially issued from 14 July onward). Sir John French issued general orders to First Army to the effect that operations be limited to ‘small aggressive threats which will not require much ammunition or many troops’. Three New Army Divisions arrived during May: the 9th (Scottish), the 12th (Eastern) and the 14th (Light). Thirteen more were to arrive during the months July to September, including the 2nd Canadian Division. No development of a reserve was possible, the new units serving only to enable the extensions of the line held by the British army.

Army staffs issued new training doctrines in the instructional pamphlets ‘The Training of Divisions for Offensive Action’, and ‘The Training and Employment of Bombers’, amongst others.

Version One of events of June 15th 1915 from “The Long, Long Trail”  (See version two below)

The Second Action of Givenchy, 15 – 16 June 1915

IV Corps (Rawlinson)
7th Division
51st (Highland) Division
1st Canadian Division (This is the Battalion in which Arthur Holderness fought when he was killed on June 15, 1915)

Joffre was planning to renew the attack in Artois on 2 June 1915; the British would need to support by making a flank attack near Haisnes or Loos. However the Loos battlefield was dominated from the high ground near Violaines north of the La Bassée Canal. It was decided that IV Corps under Henry Rawlinson would attack on the front between Chapelle St Roch and Rue d’Ouvert on 11 June, with the intention of seizing these heights. The action was postponed as it was learned that the French would not be ready for their attack until the 16 June.

The 7th Division moved into the Givenchy sector shortly after their costly involvement in the Aubers Ridge and Festubert assaults. It proved to be a very difficult line to hold, being subject to constant mining, sniping and trench mortar activity. A decision was taken to make a large-scale attack on the German front between a point East of Givenchy to just South of Rue d’Ouvert, to capture some key points. 21st Brigade was selected to lead the attack, with two battalions in the front wave. On their right, the Canadians were to attack a strong point called ‘Dorchester’ and forming a defensive flank near the Canal; on their left, the 51st (Highland) Division would move on Rue d’Ouvert from the north. To maintain contact between the main thrusts, the 1st Grenadier Guards of 20th Brigade would advance over the flat ground towards the village. After several postponements, the attack was fixed for the evening of 15 June 1915.

A complete and costly failure
The infantry assault was preceded by 48 hours slow bombardment, aimed at destroying trenches and wire; a heavier 12-hour fire would precede the actual attack. Great attention was paid to air co-operation and observation, largely to ensure economy of use of ammunition. The infantry advanced at 5.58pm, just after the miners of the 176th Tunnelling Company RE had blown a 3000-lb mine under the Duck’s Bill position.

The German line in this area was formidable, with very deep trenches and dugouts that the weak British bombardment (not helped by poor observation through long grass and poor light) barely touched. Even before the artillery fire lifted, once the Germans saw the 2nd Yorkshires and 2nd Wiltshires advancing they manned the parapets. Machine gun and rifle fire cut down most of the attacking troops. The attack was a complete failure, despite the enormous bravery and dash of the 21st Brigade. The 2nd Yorks, on the right in front of Givenchy, lost heavily in the crossing of no man’s land: of A Company’s 5 officers and 170 men who attacked, only 40 were not hit. Of B Company, 1 officer and 31 men escaped, of 5 and 180 who went over. Even so, some men of A Coy under 2/Lt. Belcher got into the German front line, but without support could not hold on. Captain Raley and most of his B Coy were hit before they got away from their own parapet. On the left of the Yorks advance, a small party under 2/Lt. Lloyd Jones bombed their way towards the mine crater down a sunken lane, but eventually every one of this party became a casualty. The 2nd Wiltshires did not even get as far as the Yorks, only a few men getting even as far as 50 yards from the German line in front of Chapelle St. Roch. The Canadians and Highlanders suffered similarly.

7th Divisional HQ initially ordered 21st Brigade to renew the attack, with the 2nd Bedfords to strengthen the Wilts and Yorks. However, once it was realised that these battalions were in no condition to continue, they were relieved by the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers and Bedfords respectively. The relief took a long time due to congestion in the communication, support and front trenches, and new attack was postponed from 1.30am to 5.30am and then to the afternoon of the 16 June.

If at first you don’t succeed …
The pattern of the second attack was similar. The Canadians would once again go for ‘Dorchester’, (Pte. Arthur Holderness of Strathroy  was already dead by this time.) the RSF on the Brigade right and the Bedfords on the left. Brigade machine guns at Windy Corner and Le Plantin would give supporting indirect fire. The attack began at 4.45pm, after a thin British barrage throughout the day which ceased two minutes before the infantry attack, giving the Germans plenty of time once again to man the parapet. The results were the same: more than half of the attacking companies of the RSF were down before they even got through their own wire. In one section, five out of thirteen men were hit while still in their own trench. The CO, Major J.H.W.Pollard, called off the attack immediately. The Bedfords did slightly better, some men getting into the crater and inflicted heavy losses on the Germans there. Those would could do so crawled back during the night, and reported that during the attack the Germans had been two or three deep in their front trench, with those at the back acting as loaders for those firing.

The price of the “learning curve”
22nd Brigade relieved the 21st at Givenchy during the night of 17/18 June. The loss of over 1000 officers and men, mostly regulars (many returned from wounds received at Ypres) and ex-regular reservists, was to prove costly both in the effort of assimilating and training new drafts and in subsequent fighting. 21st Brigade had now been over the top three times in four months, following their reconstruction after the devastation of First Ypres only five months before. The burden was falling heavily indeed on the regular army Divisions; the learning curve was proving to be all too expensive.

 [Source: The Long, Long Trail]

Editorial Comment: The “learning curve” referred to means the commanding officers at this point in the war had not yet learned how to deal with trench warfare against an enemy which was deeply dug in and strongly supported by reserve units and supplies brought in by rail and good roads.  At this point the tactics were to fling as many bodies into an attack as could be found and it thus became a “war of attrition” with thousands of men being killed on  both sides (Allies and Germans).

 Version Two of events of June 15th 1915 from “Canadian Soldiers“

The Action at Givenchy, 15 June 1915

As the 1st Army reorganized, the 1st Canadian Division found itself as the right wing of the 4th Corps, then holding the centre of the Army’s front from the La Bassée Canal north to Canadian Orchard. On the left flank of the division was the 7th Division, the 51st (Highland) Division next in line beyond, and to the left of the corps was the Indian Corps holding an 8-mile front. To the south, the 1st Corps held six miles of trench in between the canal and the French 10th Army, deploying the 1st, 47th (London) and 2nd Divisions in the line. 

The narrow divisional sector afforded by the 4th Corps’ frontage of just over two and a half miles permitted two brigades to occupy reserve positions and just one brigade to man the 1,000-yard front line, which extended north from the canal, over the southwest edge of Aubers Ridge and encompassing the eastern outskirts of Givenchy-lez-la-Bassée, a shattered village that had seen a successful defensive stand by British troops in December of 1914. The trenches were dry, and the occupation of high ground permitted communications and support trenches out of observation of the enemy, allowing the concentration of troops in assembly areas in secret.

No man’s land in the Canadian sector varied from 500 yards wide on the right down to 75 yards east of Givenchy, where a semi-circular sandbagged parapet, known as the Duck’s Bill, protruded towards the enemy’s line. On the German side, responsibility for the defence of the La Bassée area still rested with the 14th Division. Next to the canal, opposing the Canadians, was the 134th (Saxon) Infantry Regiment, brought in as reinforcement from the 40th (Saxon) Division north of Armentières.

There was not enough heavy ammunition to proceed with the original plan for attacks on both sides of the canal. The project was therefore reduced to an assault by the 4th Corps on a very narrow front towards Violaines, a village 1500 yards north-west of La Bassée; and after several postponements in order to coordinate with the renewal of the French offensive, the date was set at 15 June. General Rawlinson’s orders called for an attack by the 7th and 51st Divisions against the line Chapelle St. Roch-rue d’Ouvert, with the Canadian Division “rendering such assistance as may be possible without actually assaulting the enemy’s trench line”. But the Canadians could not establish the required protective right flank without breaking through the German front line, and General Alderson’s orders of 8 and 12 June provided for an assault by the 1st Brigade on two strongpoints – H.2 opposite the Duck’s Bill, and H.3 150 yards to the north.

On this occasion the Canadians had time for careful preparation, and the preliminary arrangements which they made were to stand as a model for successful major engagements fought later by the Canadian Corps. The artillery available for the 4th Corps’ operation had been divided into five groups. Covering the Canadian front was a group under Brig.-Gen. H.E. Burstall (Commander of the Canadian Divisional Artillery), which included eight 4.5-inch and eight 6-inch howitzers, a group of French 75-mm. guns, and the 2nd and 3rd Brigades C.F.A. (the 1st Brigade C.F.A. was employed in a group supporting the 7th Division’s right). The Canadian 18-pounders had the task of destroying the enemy’s wire. Determined that there should be no criticism over uncut wire after the battle, General Burstall insisted that the infantry express themselves as satisfied before the assault. The successive postponements prolonged the task, for the enemy was able to repair some of the breaches by night; as a result the artillery was forced to exceed the expenditure of ammunition prescribed by the First Army (six rounds of shrapnel per yard). Afterwards the commander of the 1st Brigade reported that the wire on his front “was found to have been most satisfactorily dealt with”.

The constant influx of “lessons learned” had not ended with Festubert; the need to neutralize enemy forward machine-guns was all too apparent after the costly assaults at Festubert. In an attempt to combat enemy M.G.s directly, three 18-pounders were fitted with gunshields from heavy armour plate and silenced with rubber tires, then dragged ahead at night. Two were emplaced at the Duck’s Bill, just 75 yards from the German trenches and a third, from a separate battery, inside a ruined farmhouse inside of 300 yards away from H.3. The 1st Battalion was able to assemble in relative safety in an assembly trench built by engineers and working parties by mid-afternoon on 15 June, and prepared to make its assault in successive company waves.

Two days earlier, the Short Magazine, Lee Enflield (SMLE) had replaced the Ross Rifle throughout the Canadian Division.²⁸ The Ross, a fine weapon for target shooting, had been unpopular for its apparent tendency to jam during rapid firing in battle conditions. The 1st Battalion went into the attack armed completely with British SMLEs. A slow, two-day artillery bombardment was quickened at 6:00 a.m. into just 12 hours of heavy fire, and at 5:45 p.m., 15 minutes before Zero Hour, the three armoured guns were revealed, the two at the Duck’s Bill blasting the enemy parapet through open sights and the third holding fire for fear of hitting friendly targets. Machine guns at H.3 were thus not effected, and the program of wire-cutting by the artillery had let the Germans to anticipate the assault. An immediate and heavy concentration of shells fell on Givenchy, including the Canadian assembly trenches, and the 18-pounders at the Duck’s Bill were knocked out of action, though they were able beforehand to fire 120 rounds, knock out three German machine-guns, and breach the German parapet.

Two minutes before Zero Hour, an enormous mine laid by British engineers was exploded close to the German line. Plans to explode H.2 were scrubbed by the discovery of water under No Man’s Land, and the increased size of the charge, intended to compensate, did not have the desired effect. H.2 was not touched, and a crater over 40 yards wide was created, and bomb reserves in the Canadian front line were either detonated or buried as a result of the massive explosion, causing casualties among the bombing parties of the 1st Battalion. The lead infantry company of the 1st did not wait for the debris to stop raining down before they started their attack, followed by a supporting company with two machine guns, which deployed in the enemy’s front line trench. As their covering barrage lifted, both companies advanced to the German second line to begin bombing right and left and establishing block , the third company crossing No Man’s Land at 6:10 p.m. to occupy the German front line behind them, the fourth company arriving at 7:00 p.m..

Early reports from the sector of the main attack, where the 7th and 51st Divisions were each assaulting with two battalions, indicated the capture of the German front line across the whole of the 4th Corps front. But later it was established that the enemy still held H.3. Farther north he was also holding the crater of a mine which the 7th Division had exploded twelve days earlier, and from these two positions his machine-gun fire swept no man’s land as far south as the Duck’s Bill. Thus he was able to play havoc with the Canadian third and fourth waves, and at the same time cover the reoccupation of his lost trenches. Meanwhile the 1st Battalion’s attempts to bomb northward towards H.3 had been halted by German counter-bombing and by the attackers’ shortage of grenades. The situation for the Canadians in the enemy’s second line became critical, for the 7th Division’s failure to advance beyond the opposing front line had left an open flank. To meet a German counter-attack the 1st Battalion’s machine-gun officer, Lieutenant F. W.Campbell, took one of his guns forward from the enemy’s front line. The tripod had been broken, but a the only other surviving member of the detachment, Private H. Vincent, supported the weapon on his back while Campbell kept on firing until he fell, mortally wounded. When the last round had been expended, Vincent, who was later awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal, crawled back to the Canadian lines, dragging his gun behind him. Lieutenant Campbell received the Victoria Cross.²⁹

The action continued as bombers of the 2nd Battalion, reinforced by two platoons of the 3rd Battalion, kept up the fight from the mine crater. A company of the 3rd Battalion sent forward just before 9:00 p.m. was held up at the Canadian front line by enemy fire. The 1st Battalion’s advance companies, cut off from reinforcements and supplies, were forced to fall back to the German front line trench earlier in the evening, and between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. the German front line also had to be evacuated. The 1st Battalion had been roughly handled, losing a devastating 20 officers and 366 all ranks in total.

The 3rd Battalion was ordered in to restore the situation at 11:30 p.m. but uncertainty along the front of the entire Corps and the length of time necessary to mount a renewed bombardment cause several postponements. All three divisions renewed the attack at 4:45 p.m. on 16 June following a two-hour bombardment, the maximum that available ammunition permitted. The enemy was prepared for this renewed attack and not a single permanent hold could be gained on the German trenches, the enemy simply manning the parapet in the wake of the barrage opposite the 3rd Battalion and letting loose a hail of small arms and M.G. fire. At 9:00 p.m. the Royal Canadian Dragoons, ordered to try again, were stood down. The 1st Canadian Brigade went into a defensive role and on 19 June Sir John French ordered further attempts to gain ground immediately stopped, noting the French offensive in Artois had come to an end and any further British actions were no longer required.